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Abstract
We present the first combinatorial polynomial time algorithm for com-
puting the equilibrium of the Arrow-Debreu market model with linear util-
ities. Our algorithm views the allocation of money as flows and iteratively
improves the balanced flow as in [Devanur et al. 2008] for Fisher’s model.
We develop new methods to carefully deal with the flows and surpluses
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during price adjustments. Our algorithm performs O(n6 log(nU)) maxi-
mum flow computations, where n is the number of agents and U is the
maximum integer utility. The flows have to be presented as numbers of
bitlength O(n log(nU)) to guarantee an exact solution. Previously, [Jain
2007, Ye 2007] have given polynomial time algorithms for this problem,
which are based on solving convex programs using the ellipsoid algorithm
and the interior-point method, respectively.
1 Introduction
We provide the first combinatorial polynomial algorithm for computing the equi-
librium of the linear version of an economic market model formulated byWalras1
in 1874 [28]. The model is also known as the linear exchange model. In this
model, every agent has an initial endowment of some goods and a utility func-
tion over sets of goods. Goods are assumed to be divisible. The market clears
at a set of prices if each agent can spend its entire budget (= the total value of
its goods at the set of prices) on a bundle of goods with maximum utility, and
all goods are completely sold. Market clearing prices are also called equilibrium
prices. In the linear version of the problem, all utility functions are linear.
Formally, the linear model is defined as follows. We may assume w.l.o.g. that
the number of goods is equal to the number of agents and that the i-th agent
owns the i-th good. Let uij ≥ 0 be the utility for buyer i if all of good j is
allocated to him. If fraction xij of good j is allocated to buyer i, the total utility
for i is ∑
j
uijxij .
We make the standard assumption that each agent likes some good, i.e., for
all i, maxj uij > 0, and that each good is liked by some agent, i.e., for all j,
maxi uij > 0. Agents are selfish and spend money only on goods that give them
maximum utility per unit of money, i.e., if p = (p1, . . . , pn) is a price vector then
buyer i is only willing to buy goods j with uij/pj = maxj uij/pj. An equilibrium
is a vector p of positive prices and allocations xij ≥ 0 such that
• all goods are completely sold: ∑i xij = 1
• all money is spent: ∑j xijpj = pi
• only maximum utility per unit of money goods are bought:
xij > 0 ⇒ uij
pj
= αi, where αi = max
ℓ
uiℓ
pℓ
The existence of an equilibrium is non-obvious. Walras argued existence
algorithmically. Assume that a vector p of prices is not an equilibrium vector.
Then there is a good for which demand exceeds supply. Increase the price of the
1Walras’ model is actually more general and also involves production.
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good until demand equals supply. Of course, this might destroy the equilibrium
for other goods. However, the effect on the other goods will be smaller (he did
not define this term) and hence the process will converge.
Fisher [15] introduced a somewhat simpler model (agents come with budgets)
in 1891 and showed how to compute an equilibrium for the case of three agents
and three goods by an analog computer. The computer is a hydro-mechanical
device that stabilizes at equilibrium prices and allocations [3].
The first rigorous existence proof is due to Wald [27]. It required fairly
strong assumptions. The existence proof for the general model was given by
Arrow and Debreu [2] in 1954. He proved that the market equilibrium always
exists if the utility functions are concave. The result is prominently mentioned
in their Nobel prize laudation and the market is usually referred to as the
“Arrow-Debreu market”. However, their proof is based on Kakutani’s fixed-
point theorem and hence non-constructive. Gale [16, 17] gives necessary and
sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in the linear model; see
Section 2.5.
The development of algorithms started in the 60s. There is a wide liter-
ature in the economics and mathematics community, and since 2000 also in
the algorithm community. The survey paper by Codenotti, Pemmaraju and
Varadarajan [8] surveys the literature until 2004. Early algorithms, for exam-
ple by Scarf, Smale, Kuhn, and Todd, are inspired by fixed-point proofs or are
Newton-based and compute approximations. The running time of these algo-
rithms is exponential.
First approximation algorithms with polynomial running time appeared af-
ter 2000. Jain, Madhian, and Saberi [23] gave a polynomial time approximation
scheme. Devanur and Vazirani [12] obtained a strongly polynomial time ap-
proximation scheme and Garg and Kapoor [19] gave a simplified approximation
scheme. Recently, Ghiyasvand and Orlin [21] gave an approximation scheme
with running time O(nǫ (m+ n logn)); here m is the number of positive utilities
uij . The approximation algorithms are combinatorial.
Exact algorithms are also known. Eaves [13] presented the first exact algo-
rithm for the linear exchange model. He reduced the model to a linear com-
plementary problem which is then solved by Lemke’s algorithm. The algorithm
is not polynomial time. Garg, Mehta, Sohoni, and Vazirani [18] give a com-
binatorial interpretation of the algorithm. Polynomial time exact algorithms
were obtained based on the characterization of equilibria as the solution set of
a convex program. The recent paper by Devanur, Garg, and Ve´gh [10] surveys
these characterizations. For example, Nenakov and Primak [24] showed that
equilibria are precisely the solutions of the system
pi > 0 xij ≥ 0
∑
j
uijxij ≥ uik
pk
pi for all i and k.
Note that uikpk pi is the utility obtained by the i-th buyer if he spends his entire
budget, which is pi under the assumption that his good is completely sold, on
good k. The program above is not convex in the variables pi and xij . However,
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after the substitution pi = e
πi it becomes a convex program in the variables πi
and xij . Jain [22] rediscovered this convex program and showed how to solve
it with a nontrivial extension of the ellipsoid method. His algorithm is the first
polynomial time algorithm for the linear Arrow-Debreu market. Ye [29] showed
that polynomial time can also be achieved with the interior point method. The
latter algorithm runs in time O(n4 logU) for integral utilities bounded by U and
is significantly faster than the algorithm presented in this paper.
In Fisher markets each agent comes with a budget to the market. It is a
special case of the Arrow-Debreu market and algorithmically simpler. Eisenberg
and Gale [14] characterized equilibria by a convex program. With the advent of
the ellipsoid method, their characterization gave rise to a polynomial algorithm.
The first combinatorial algorithm was given by Devanur, Padimitriou, Saberi,
and Varzirani [11]. Their algorithm uses a maximum flow algorithm as a black
box. When the input data are integral, their algorithm needs O(n5 logU +
n4 log emax) max-flow computations, where n is the number of buyers, U the
largest integer utility, and emax the largest initial amount of money of a buyer.
If we use the common O(n3) max-flow algorithm (see [1]), their running time is
O(n8 logU+n7 log emax). Orlin [25] improved the running time to O(n
4 logU+
n3 log emax) and also gave the first strongly polynomial algorithm with running
time O(n4 logn). Our work is inspired by these papers.
Our algorithm has the advantage of being combinatorial (see Figure 2 for
a complete listing), and hence, gives additional insight in the nature of the
problem. We obtain equilibrium prices by a simple procedure that iteratively
adjusts prices and allocations in a carefully chosen, but intuitive manner. We
describe a basic version of the algorithm in Section 2. The basic version already
achieves a polynomial number of arithmetic operations on rationals; however,
the bitlength of the rationals may be exponential in the size of the problem
instance. In Section 3 we achieve polynomial time by the use of approximate
arithmetic. The algorithm solves O(n6 log(nU)) flow problems and needs to deal
with numbers of bitlength O(n log(nU)). With an O(n3) maxflow algorithm,
the running time becomes O(n10 log2(nU)). We introduce some basic concepts
in Section 1.2 and discuss further related work in Section 1.1. In Section 1.3,
we give a high-level view of our algorithm.
The problem of finding a strongly polynomial algorithm for the linear Arrow-
Debreu model remains open.
1.1 Further Related Work
There are also algorithms for the Arrow-Debreu model with non-linear utili-
ties [7, 6]. The CES (constant elasticity of substitution) utility functions have
drawn much attention; here, the utility functions are of the form u(x1, ..., xn) =
(
∑n
j=1 cjx
ρ
j )
1/ρ for −∞ < ρ < 1 and ρ 6= 0. Codenotti, McCune, Penumatcha,
and Varadarajan [6] have shown that for ρ > 0 and −1 ≤ ρ < 0, there are poly-
nomial algorithms based on a convex program. In contrast, Chen, Paparas and
Yannakakis [4] have shown that it is PPAD-hard to solve market equilibrium of
CES utilities for ρ < −1. They also define a new concept “non-monotone util-
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ities”, and show the PPAD-hardness to solve the markets with non-monotone
utilities. It remains open to find the exact border between tractable and in-
tractable utility functions.
All algorithms mentioned so far are centralized in the sense that the algo-
rithms need to know all the utilities at the start of the algorithm and, in the
case of iterative algorithms, the global state of the market, i.e., all prices and the
demand for each good. Cole and Fleischer [9] and Cheung, Cole, and Rastogi [5]
explore local algorithms, where each agent only knows the price and demand of
his good and, moreover, the market is run for many periods.
1.2 Model and Definitions
The linear exchange model is defined by the following assumptions; they are as
in Jain’s paper [22]:
1. There are n agents in the system. Each agent i has only one good, which is
different from the goods other people have. Agent i owns good i.
2. There is one unit of each good i. So, if the price of good i is pi, agent i will
obtain pi units of money when selling its good completely.
3. Each agent i has a linear utility function
∑
j uijxij , where xij is the amount
of good j consumed by i.
4. For all i, there is a j such that uij > 0. (Everybody likes some good.)
5. For all j, there is an i such that uij > 0. (Every good is liked by somebody.)
6. (Irreducibility) For every proper subset P of agents, there exist i ∈ P and
j /∈ P such that uij > 0.
7. Each uij is an integer between 0 and U .
Assumptions 1 to 5 are standard. Assumption 6 simplifies the presentation,
and we will come back to it in Section 2.5. Assumptions 1 to 6 guarantee that
an equilibrium with positive prices exist [17]. Assumption 7 is for the purposes
of polynomial time computation.
Let p = (p1, p2, ..., pn) denote the vector of prices of goods 1 to n, so they
are also the budgets of agents 1 to n, if goods are completely sold. In this
paper, it is useful to represent each agent i twice, once in its role as a buyer
and once in his role as (the owner of) a good. We denote the set of buyers by
B = {b1, b2, ..., bn} and the set of goods by C = {c1, c2, ..., cn}. So, if the price
of goods ci is pi, buyer bi will have pi amount of money. For a subset B
′ of
agents or a subset C′ of goods, we also use p(B′) or p(C′) to denote the total
prices of the goods the agents in B′ own or of the goods in C′. For a vector
v = (v1, v2, ..., vk), let:
– |v| = |v1|+ |v2|+ ...+ |vk| be the l1-norm of v.
– ‖v‖ =
√
v21 + v
2
2 + ...+ v
2
k be the l2-norm of v.
Each agent only buys its favorite goods, that is, the goods with the maximum
ratio of utility and price. Define the bang per buck of buyer bi to be αi =
maxj{uij/pj}.
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For a price vector p, the equality network Np is a flow network with vertex
set {s, t} ∪ B ∪ C, where s is a source node, t is a sink node, B is the set of
buyers, and C is the set of goods, and the following edge set:
– An edge (s, bi) with capacity pi for each bi ∈ B.
– An edge (ci, t) with capacity pi for each ci ∈ C.
– An edge (bi, cj) with infinite capacity whenever uij/pj = αi. We use Ep
to denote these edges.
Our task is to find a price vector p such that there is a flow in which all
edges from s and to t are saturated, i.e., (s,B∪C ∪ t) and (s∪B∪C, t) are both
minimum cuts. When this is satisfied, all goods are sold and all of the money
earned by each agent is spent on goods of maximum utility per unit of money.
For a set B′ of buyers define its neighborhood Γ(B′) in Ep to be: Γ(B
′) =
{c ∈ C | (b, c) ∈ Ep for some b ∈ B′}. Clearly, there is no edge in Ep from B′ to
C \ Γ(B′).
With respect to a flow f , define the surplus r(bi) of a buyer i to be the
residual capacity of the edge (s, bi), and define the surplus r(cj) of a good j to
be the residual capacity of the edge (cj , t). That is, r(bi) = pi −
∑
j fij , and
r(cj) = pj −
∑
i fij , where fij is the amount of flow in the edge (bi, cj). Define
the surplus vector of buyers to be r(B) = (r(b1), r(b2), ..., r(bn)). Also, define
the total surplus to be |r(B)| =∑i r(bi), which is also ∑j r(cj) since the total
capacity from s and to t are both equal to
∑
i pi. For convenience, we denote
the surplus vector of flow f ′ by r′(B). In the network corresponding to market
clearing prices, the total surplus of a maximum flow is zero.
1.3 Overview of our algorithm
The overall structure of our algorithm is shown in Figure 1 and is similar to the
ones of Devanur et al. [11] and Orlin [25] for computing equilibrium prices in
Fisher markets. However, the details are quite different. The algorithm works
iteratively. It starts with all prices pi equal to one and with a balanced flow f
in Np. The concept of a balanced flow was introduced in [11]. A balanced flow
is a flow that minimizes the l2-norm of the surplus vector r(B). Every balanced
flow is also a maximum flow. In each iteration, we first analyze the current
balanced flow and then carefully adjust prices and flow. The updated flow is
not necessarily a balanced flow in the equality network with respect to the new
prices. We therefore extend it to a balanced flow. Once the total surplus of the
current flow is tiny, we exit from the loop and round the current price vector to
a vector of equilibrium prices.
We next give more details about the price and flow update. We number the
buyers in order of decreasing surpluses: b1, . . . , bn. We find the minimal ℓ such
that r(bℓ) is substantially larger (by a factor of 1 + 1/n) than r(bℓ+1); ℓ = n
if there is no such ℓ. Let B′ = {b1, . . . , bℓ} and let Γ(B′) be the goods that
are adjacent to a buyer in B′ in the equality graph. Observe that all flow from
buyers in B′ goes to goods in Γ(B′) and all buyers in B′ have surplus. Thus
the goods in Γ(B′) have no surplus and the demand for them at the current
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Set all prices pi to one and compute a balanced flow f in Np;
Repeat
Adjust prices and flow and obtain a price vector p′ and a flow f ′;
p = p′ and f = f ′;
extend f to a balanced flow in Np;
Until the total surplus of f is tiny;
Round the price vector p to get an exact solution;
Figure 1: A high-level view of the algorithm.
prices exceeds their supply. Also, there is no flow from the buyers in B \ B′ to
the goods in Γ(B′); this is due to the fact that the flow is balanced. We raise
the prices of the goods in Γ(B′) by a common factor x and obtain a new price
vector p′. We also construct a flow f ′ from f by multiplying the flow on all
edges incident to goods in Γ(B′) by the same factor x and increasing the flow
from s to buyers in B′ such that flow conservation holds.2 Observe that the
surpluses of the goods in Γ(B′) stay zero.
The change of prices and flows affects the surpluses of the buyers, some go
up and some go down. More precisely, there are four kind of buyers, depending
on whether a buyer b belongs to B′ or not and whether the good owned by
b belongs to Γ(B′) or not. For the definition of the factor x, we perform the
following thought experiment. We increase the prices of the goods in Γ(B′) and
the flow on the edges incident to them continuously by a common factor x until
one of three events happens: (1) a new edge enters the equality graph (2) the
surplus of a buyer in B′ and a buyer in B \B′ becomes equal, or (3) x reaches
a substantial value (xmax = 1 + 1/O(n
3) in our algorithm).3
If a new equality edge arises, say (b, c) with b ∈ B′ and c 6∈ Γ(B′), we modify
f ′ further. We use the new equality edge to decrease the surplus of c and to
balance the surplus of b with the surplus of the other neighbors of c.
The new flow f ′ is not necessarily a balanced flow in Np′ . We therefore
extend f ′ to a balanced flow. We ensure that goods with surplus zero keep
surplus zero in this process. This ends the description of the main loop of the
algorithm.
In what sense are we making progress? We use two quantities to measure
progress. The first quantity is the maximum price of any good. Prices never
decrease, prices are bounded by (nU)n (Lemma 7), and in every iteration with
x = xmax at least one price increases by the factor xmax. It follows that the
number of iterations with x = xmax is bounded by a polynomial in n and logU
2In [11, 25] only prices are raised and flows stay the same. This works for Fisher’s model
because budgets are fixed. However, in the Arrow-Debreu model, an increase of prices of
goods will also increase the budgets of their owners.
3The increase of prices of goods in Γ(B′) makes the goods in C \ Γ(B′) more attractive
and hence an equality edge connecting a buyer in B′ with a good in C \Γ(B′) may come into
existence. This event also exists in [11, 25]. Events (2) and (3) have no parallel in [11, 25].
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(Lemma 8); we refer to these iterations as xmax-iterations.
Our second measure is the l2 norm of the surplus vector of the balanced flow
f .4 In xmax-iterations, the norm of the surplus vector may go up by a factor
1 + O(1/n3). In the iterations, where either event (1) or (2) occurs, the norm
of the surplus vector decreases substantially, since surplus moves from a buyer
in B′ to a buyer in B \ B′ and buyers in these two groups have, by the choice
of groups, substantially different surpluses. We show that the norm decreases
by a factor of at least 1 +Ω(1/n3) (Lemma 9). We refer to the latter iterations
as balancing iterations. We exit from the main loop, when the total surplus is
tiny (less than ǫ).
Since we know already a polynomial bound on the number of xmax-iterations,
we also get a polynomial bound on the number of balancing iterations (Lemma 10).
The algorithm, as outlined so far, has polynomial arithmetic complexity. We
doubt that it has polynomial running time. The computation stays within the
rational numbers. However, a naive analysis gives only an exponential bound on
the bitlength of prices and flows. In order to guarantee polynomial running time,
we show that is suffices to carry out the computation on rationals of polynomial
bitlength. Some changes are required to the basic algorithm to make this work,
see Section 3.
2 The Algorithm
At a high level, our algorithm is as shown in Figure 1. We introduce the notion
of a balanced flow in Section 2.1 and our approach to changing prices and flows
in Section 2.2. We will then give a detailed description of the algorithm in
Section 2.3. The extraction of the vector of equilibrium prices is discussed in
Section 2.4.
2.1 Balanced flow
As in [11], we define the concept of a balanced flow to be a maximum flow that
balances the surpluses of buyers. Balanced flows are not necessarily unique;
however, the surplus vector of the buyers is unique.
Definition 1 ([11]). A balanced flow wrt. to a price vector p is a maximum
flow in the network Np that minimizes ‖r(B)‖.
For flows f and f ′ and their surplus vectors r(B) and r′(B), respectively,
if ‖r(B)‖ < ‖r′(B)‖, then we say that f is more balanced than f ′. The next
lemma justifies the adjective “balanced”.
Lemma 1 ([11]). If a ≥ bi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, ..., k and δ ≥
∑k
i=1 δi, where δ, δi ≥ 0,
i = 1, 2, ..., k, then:
‖(a, b1, b2, ..., bk)‖2 ≤ ‖(a+ δ, b1 − δ1, b2 − δ2, ..., bk − δk)‖2 − δ2.
4[11] also uses the l2 norm of the surplus vector as a potential function. They show that
it is strictly decreasing from one iteration to the next.
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Proof.
(a+ δ)2 +
k∑
i=1
(bi − δi)2 − a2 −
k∑
i=1
b2i ≥ 2aδ + δ2 − 2
k∑
i=1
biδi
≥ δ2 + 2a(δ −
k∑
i=1
δi) ≥ δ2.
Devanur et al [11] showed how to compute a balanced flow with O(n) max-
flow computations. We need a slight extension of their result which also estab-
lishes that the edge-flows in a balanced flow are rational numbers with small
denominator, assuming that the input data is integral.
Lemma 2 ([11]). Let p be a price vector. Given a flow f in the network Np, a
balanced flow f ′′ can be computed with at most n max-flow computations. Goods
with surplus zero wrt. f also have surplus zero wrt. f ′′.
If all prices, utilities, and entries of f are integral, the entries of f ′′ are
rational numbers with a common denominator n!.
Proof. We first turn f into a maximum flow by finding the maximum flow in
the residual graph Gf from s to t, which takes about O(n
3) time. Observe that
goods with surplus zero keep surplus zero.
If f saturates all edges out of s, there is no surplus with respect to f and
hence f is balanced. So assume that at least one of the edges out of s is not
saturated. In the residual graph5 Gf w.r.t. to f , let S ⊆ B ∪ C be the set of
nodes reachable from s, and let T = (B ∪C) \S be the remaining nodes. There
must be at least one unsaturated edge into t and the source of any such edge
belongs to T . Thus T is nonempty.
There are no edges from S∩B to T ∩C in the equality graph since any such
edge has infinite capacity and hence would belong to the residual graph, and
there is no flow from T ∩B to S∩C as the reversals of these edges would belong
to the residual graph. The edges from s to T ∩B and the edges from S ∩ C to
t are saturated and (s∪S, T ∪ t) is a minimum cut of the residual graph. Thus,
the buyers in T ∩B and the goods in S ∩ C have no surplus w.r.t. f , and this
holds true for every maximum flow since every maximum flow must saturate
all edges in a minimum cut. Let G′ be the network spanned by s ∪ S ∪ t, and
let f ′ be the balanced maximum flow in G′. The flow f ′ can be computed by
n max-flow computations; Corollary 8.8 in [11] is applicable since (s ∪ S, t) is
a min-cut in G′. Finally, f ′ together with the restriction of f to s ∪ T ∪ t is a
balanced flow f ′′ in G.
5The residual graph Gf with respect to a flow f is defined in the standard way. It has
vertex set B ∪ C ∪ {s, t} and edge set ({s} × B) ∪ Ep ∪ E
−1
p ∪ (C × {t}). Edge (s, bi) has
capacity pi− fsi, edge (bi, cj) ∈ Ep has infinite capacity, edge (cj , bi) ∈ E
−1
p has capacity fij
and edge (cj , t) has capacity pj − fjt.
9
The surpluses of the goods in S ∩C stay at zero and hence unchanged. The
surpluses of the goods in T ∩ C are clearly unchanged.
For the claim about the rational representation of the entries of f ′′, we have
to give more details of the balanced flow algorithm in [11]. They use a divide
and conquer approach. Consider the residual network Gf with respect to f
restricted to the edges connecting vertices in S and let ravg be the average
surplus of the buyers in S; ravg is a rational number with denominator |S|.
Give every buyer bi in S a supply/demand of r(bi) − ravg; positive values are
supplies and nonpositive values are demands.6. Compute a maximum flow g.
If all supplies can be routed, there is a balanced flow, namely f + g, in which
all buyers in S have surplus equal to ravg . We come to the case that not all
supplies can be routed. Let SS be the nodes in S reachable from the buyers bi
with r(bi) > ravg in the residual graph with respect to f + g, and let TS be the
remaining nodes. Then (SS , TS) is a min-cut and we can recurse on the buyers
in SS and the buyers in TS. Since the cardinalities of both sets of buyers is less
than |S|, the flows obtained are rational numbers with common denominator at
most n!.
2.2 Price and Flow Adjustment
We introduce a method for price adjustments. We never decrease any price
and we only increase prices of goods with zero surplus that can be reached from
buyers with positive surplus. For such goods, demand exceeds supply and hence
intuition suggests to make such goods more expensive. Increasing the price of
a good and keeping the flow into the good constant, will create surplus at the
good. We avoid this and hence whenever we increase the price of a good, we
also increase the inflow of the good by the same amount. For goods whose price
stays unchanged, the inflow is not changed. In this way, the surplus of any good
whose price is increased stays zero. Changing the inflow into some goods also
changes the outflow of some buyers. We adjust their inflows accordingly.
How should prices be increased? Let Γ be the set of goods for which we
increase prices and inflows; we will discuss the choice of Γ below. We increase
the prices of the goods in Γ and the inflow into these goods gradually by a
common multiplicative factor x > 1; the choice of x will be discussed below. As
a consequence, any ratio uij/pj becomes uij/(xpj) for cj ∈ Γ and stays constant
for cj 6∈ Γ. The change may create and destroy equality edges. We stop the
increase of x at the latest when an equality edge carrying positive flow will be
destroyed by a further increase. We may destroy equality edges carrying no
flow, but this does no harm.
For which goods should we increase prices? In a balanced flow f with surplus
vector r, we choose a positive surplus bound S and consider the set of buyers
B(S) with surplus at least S, i.e.,
B(S) = {bi ∈ B | r(bi) ≥ S} .
6The nodes bi with r(bi) = ravg may be treated as supply or demand nodes.
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Let
Γ(B(S)) = {cj ∈ C | (bi, cj) ∈ Ep for some bi ∈ B(S)}
be the set of goods connected to the buyers in B(S) by edges in the equality
graph with respect to the current price vector p. We increase the prices of the
goods in Γ(B(S)).
Lemma 3. In a balanced flow f in Np, there is no edge in Ep that carries flow
from B \B(S) to Γ(B(S)). Moreover, the goods in Γ(B(S)) have no surplus.
Proof. Suppose there is an edge (bi, cj) that carries flow such that bi /∈ B(S) and
cj ∈ Γ(B(S)). Then, in the residual graph, there are directed edges (bk, cj) and
(cj , bi) with nonzero capacities with bk ∈ B(S). However, r(bk) ≥ S > r(bi),
and hence we can augment along this path and get a more balanced flow by
Lemma 1, contradicting that f is already a balanced flow.
The goods in Γ(B(S)) have no surplus, since the buyers in B(S) have positive
surplus, f is a maximum flow, and all the flow coming form buyers in B(S) goes
to the goods in Γ(B(S)).
We increase the prices of the goods in Γ(B(S)) and the flow on the edges
incident to these goods by a common multiplicative factor x > 1. We will leave
the prices of the goods in C \ Γ(B(S)) and the flows on the edges incident to
these goods unchanged. For a buyer bi, we scale the flow on the edge (s, bi) by
a factor x if bi ∈ B(S) and leave it unchanged otherwise. Note that for a buyer
bi ∈ B(S) all outgoing flow goes to goods in Γ(B(S)), and for a buyer bi 6∈ B(S)
none of the outgoing flow goes to a good in Γ(B(S)).
p′j =
{
x · pj if cj ∈ Γ(B(S));
pj if cj /∈ Γ(B(S)).
(1)
f ′ij =
{
x · fij if cj ∈ Γ(B(S));
fij if cj /∈ Γ(B(S)).
(2)
f ′jt =
{
x · fjt if cj ∈ Γ(B(S));
fjt if cj /∈ Γ(B(S)).
(3)
f ′si =
{
x · fsi if bi ∈ B(S)
fsi if bi 6∈ B(S)
(4)
Since there are no edges from B(S) to C \Γ(B(S)), and the edges from B\B(S)
to Γ(B(S)) are not carrying flow, an equivalent definition of f ′ij is f
′
ij = xfij if
bi ∈ B(S) and f ′ij = fij if bi 6∈ B(S).
We next discuss constraints on x. We must make sure that equality edges
carrying positive flow stay equality edges and that surpluses of buyers stay
nonnegative.
Let us first discuss the effect of the price change on the equality graph.
Equality edges from B \ B(S) to Γ(B(S)) may disappear. Since they are not
carrying flow, this is of no concern. If there are edges (bi, cj) and (bi, ck) in Ep
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where bi ∈ B(S), cj , ck ∈ Γ(B(S)), then uij/pj = uik/pk. Since the prices in
Γ(B(S)) are multiplied by a common factor x, uij/pj and uik/pk remain equal
after a price adjustment. Similarly, if bi 6∈ B(S) and cj , ck 6∈ Γ(B(S)), the
ratios uij/pj and uik/pk are unchanged. However, the goods in C \ Γ(B(S))
will become more attractive, so there may be edges from B(S) to C \ Γ(B(S))
entering the equality network, and the increase of prices needs to stop when this
happens. Define such a factor to be xeq(S), that is,
xeq(S) = min
{
uij
pj
· pk
uik
| bi ∈ B(S), (bi, cj) ∈ Ep, ck /∈ Γ(B(S))
}
.
We need O(n2) multiplications/divisions to compute xeq(S). When we increase
the prices of the goods in Γ(B(S)) by a common factor x ≤ xeq(S), the equality
edges in (B(S) × Γ(B(S))) ∪ ((B \ B(S)) × (C \ Γ(B(S)))) will remain in the
network.
We also need to make sure that the surpluses stay nonnegative. The sur-
pluses of goods stay the same; they stay zero for the goods in Γ(B(S)) since
inflow and outflow is changed by the same factor x and they stay unchanged
for the goods outside Γ(B(S)) since inflow and outflow stay the same. The
capacities of the edges (s, bj) and (cj , t) for cj ∈ Γ(B(S)) are multiplied by x,
the capacities of the other edges incident to s or t are unchanged. For buyers
bi ∈ B(S) with ci ∈ C \ Γ(B(S)) the surplus goes down as the capacity of the
inedge stays at pi and the outflow pi − r(bi) is multiplied by x. Thus we need
x ≤ pi/(pi − r(bi)) for all such i.
We distinguish four kinds of buyers:
type 1 if bi ∈ B(S) and ci ∈ Γ(B(S));
type 2 if bi ∈ B(S) and ci /∈ Γ(B(S));
type 3 if bi /∈ B(S) and ci ∈ Γ(B(S));
type 4 if bi /∈ B(S) and ci /∈ Γ(B(S)).
Theorem 1. Given a balanced flow f in Np, a positive surplus bound S, and a
parameter x > 1 such that x ≤ min {pi/(pi − r(bi)) | bi ∈ B(S), ci /∈ Γ(B(S))}
and x ≤ xeq(S), the flow f ′ defined in (2) to (4) is a feasible flow in the equality
network with respect to the prices in (1). The surplus of each good remains
unchanged, and the surpluses of the buyers become:
r′(bi) =


x · r(bi) if bi ∈ B(S), ci ∈ Γ(B(S)) (type 1);
(1− x)pi + x · r(bi) if bi ∈ B(S), ci /∈ Γ(B(S)) (type 2);
(x− 1)pi + r(bi) if bi /∈ B(S), ci ∈ Γ(B(S)) (type 3);
r(bi) if bi /∈ B(S), ci /∈ Γ(B(S)) (type 4).
Proof. Since the flows on all edges associated with goods in Γ(B(S)) are mul-
tiplied by x, the surplus of each good in Γ(B(S)) remains zero. The surplus of
type 2 buyers decreases because the flows from a type 2 buyer bi are multiplied
by x, but its budget pi is not changed. The flow after adjustment is x(pi−r(bi));
this is at most pi. The new surplus with respect to f
′ is r′(bi) = (1−x)pi+xr(bi).
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Since both money and flows are multiplied by x for a type 1 buyer, their
surplus is also multiplied by x. For a type 3 buyer bi, their flows are not changed,
but their money is multiplied by x, so the new surplus is xpi − (pi − r(bi)). For
type 4 buyers, neither flow nor budget changes, and hence the surplus does not
change.
The surplus of type 1 and 3 buyers increases, the surplus of type 2 buyers
decreases, and the surplus of type 4 buyers does not change. We define quantities
x23(S) and x24(S) at which the surplus of a type 2 and type 3 buyer, respectively
type 4 buyer becomes equal:
x23(S) = min
{
pi + pj − r(bj)
pi + pj − r(bi) | bi is type 2 and bj is type 3 buyer
}
,
x24(S) = min
{
pi − r(bj)
pi − r(bi) | bi is type 2 and bj is type 4 buyer
}
.
2.3 Whole procedure
The whole algorithm is shown in Figure 2. We call one execution of the loop
body an iteration. We use constants R, ǫ, ∆, and xmax as defined in the first
line of the algorithm.
Our algorithm is essentially a repeated application of Theorem 1. We start
with all prices equal to one and f equal to a balanced flow. In each iteration we
choose appropriate values of S and x and then adjust prices and flow as given
in (1) to (4).
The price and flow adjustment decreases the surplus of type 2 buyers, in-
creases the surplus of type 3 buyers and leaves the surplus of type 4 buyers
unchanged. Thus there is the chance of the surplus of a type 2 buyer and a
type 3 or 4 buyer to become equal. The effect on the norm of the surplus vec-
tor will be large if these surpluses were significantly different before the flow
adjustment. These considerations led us to the following choice of S. We first
determine the smallest ℓ for which r(bℓ)r(bℓ+1) > 1 + 1/n, and let ℓ = n when there
is no such ℓ. We then set S = r(bℓ) and obtain B(S) = {b1, . . . , bℓ}. With
this choice the surpluses of the buyers in B(S) are at least by a factor 1 + 1/n
larger than the surpluses of the buyers outside B(S) and two such surpluses be-
coming equal will constitute significant progress. If a new equality edge arises,
the price adjustment by x will not balance a big surplus and a small surplus.
However, we will be able to use the new equality edge for balancing a big sur-
plus and a small surplus. For technical reasons, we will never increase x beyond
xmax = 1 + 1/(Rn
3).
When the total surplus becomes tiny (less than ǫ), we exit from the loop. At
this point, the price vector p can be turned into a vector of equilibrium prices
essentially by a rounding procedure. This will be discussed in Section 2.4.
Lemma 4. Once the surplus of a good becomes zero, it stays zero. As long as
a good has non-zero surplus, its price stays at one.
13
Set R = 256, ǫ = 1/(8n4nU3n), ∆ = n5/ǫ, and xmax = 1 + 1/(Rn
3);
Set pi = 1 for all i and compute a balanced flow f in Np;
Repeat
Sort the buyers by their surpluses in decreasing order: b1, b2, ..., bn;
Find the smallest ℓ for which r(bℓ)/r(bℓ+1) > 1 + 1/n, and
let ℓ = n when there is no such ℓ;
Let S = r(bℓ) and B(S) = {b1, . . . , bℓ};
Compute x = min(xeq(S), x23(S), x24(S), xmax);
compute p′ and f ′ according to (1) to (4);
If x = xeq , modify f
′ further according to the procedure in Figure 3;
p = p′ and f = f ′;
update f to a balanced flow in Np; /* goods with zero surplus keep zero surplus */
Until |r(B)| < ǫ;
Round p to equilibrium prices by the procedure in Figure 4;
Figure 2: The whole algorithm
Proof. Augmentation of a flow to a maximum flow does not increase any sur-
plus. Balancing a flow leaves the surplus of all goods unchanged (Lemma 2).
Increasing prices and flows according to Theorem 1 does not change the sur-
plus of any good. Neither does the augmentation along a new equality edge
according to the procedure in Figure 3.
Lemma 5. Let b1, b2, . . . , bn be the buyers sorted in order of decreasing sur-
pluses. Let ℓ be minimal such that r(bℓ)/r(bℓ+1 > 1+1/n. Let ℓ = n, if there is
no such ℓ. Then r(bℓ) ≥ |r(B)|/(en), r(bi) ≤ enr(bℓ) for all i, and r(bi) ≥ r(bℓ)
for every type 2 buyer bi.
Proof. Clearly, b1 is at least |r(B)|/n. Also, r(bj)r(bj+1) ≤ 1 + 1/n for j < ℓ, and
hence r(bℓ) ≥ r(b1)(1+1/n)−n > |r(B)|/(e ·n). If bi is a type 2 buyer, i ≤ ℓ.
Lemma 6. With S as defined above and x = min(xeq(S), x23(S), x24(S), xmax),
f ′ is a feasible flow in Np′ .
Proof. We only need to show that the surpluses of all buyers are nonnegative. If
there is a type 3 or 4 buyer, this is obvious, because x is at most the minimum
of x23(S) and x24(S). If there are no type 3 or 4 buyers, B(S) = B, and each
r(bi) is larger than |r(B)|/(e ·n). Since goods in Γ(B(S)) have surplus zero and
the total surplus is positive, there must be goods outside Γ(B(S)). Goods not
in Γ(B(S)) have no buyers and hence positive surplus. Thus their price is one,
and their surplus is also one. Hence |r(B)| ≥ 1 and the price of the good owned
by a type 2 buyer is one. Thus the surplus of a type 2 buyer cannot reach zero,
when x = xmax.
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In order to bound the number of iterations, we distinguish between xmax-
iterations (x = xmax) and balancing iterations (x < xmax). In order to bound
the number of xmax-iterations, we first prove an upper bound on the maximum
price (Lemma 7) and then combine this upper bound with the observation that
an xmax-iteration increases at least one price by a factor xmax (Lemma 8). In
order to bound the number of balancing iterations, we study the evolution of
the norm of the surplus vector. We show that an xmax-iteration increases it by
at most a factor 1 + O(1/n3) and a balancing iteration divides it by at least a
factor of 1 + Ω(1/n3). Since we have already a bound on the number of bad
iterations, a bound on the number of good iterations follows (Lemma 10).
Lemma 7. In the course of the algorithm, all prices stay bounded by (nU)n−1.
Proof. It is enough to show that during the entire algorithm, for any non-empty
and proper subset Cˆ of goods, there are goods ci ∈ Cˆ, cj /∈ Cˆ such that pi/pj ≤
nU . So, when we sort all the prices in decreasing order, the ratio of two adjacent
prices is at most nU . Since there is always a good with price 1, the largest price
is at most (nU)n−1.
If Cˆ contains a good with surplus, then it contains a good with price one.
The claim follows.
So assume all goods in Cˆ have surplus zero, and let Bˆ = Γ(Cˆ) be the set of
buyers adjacent to goods in Cˆ in the equality graph.
If there exist bi ∈ Bˆ and cj ∈ C \ Cˆ with uij > 0, let ck ∈ Cˆ be one of the
goods adjacent to bi in the equality graph. Then uij/pj ≤ αi = uik/pk. So,
pk/pj ≤ uik/uij ≤ U .
Otherwise, uij = 0 for every bi ∈ Bˆ and cj ∈ C \ Cˆ, i.e., the buyers in Bˆ
are only interested in goods in Cˆ. Then Bˆ must be a proper subset of B as
otherwise no buyer would be interested in the goods in C \ Cˆ, a contradiction to
Assumption (5). Since the buyers in Bˆ must be interested in at least one good
that is not owned by them (Assumption (6)), there must be a k such that ck ∈ Cˆ
and bk 6∈ Bˆ. Let B′ =
{
j | bj ∈ Bˆ, cj 6∈ Cˆ
}
and B′′ =
{
j | bj 6∈ Bˆ, cj ∈ Cˆ
}
. We
have:
pk ≤ p(B′′) = p(Cˆ)− p(
{
j | bj ∈ Bˆ, cj ∈ Cˆ
}
)
≤ p(Bˆ)− p(
{
j | bj ∈ Bˆ, cj ∈ Cˆ
}
) = p(B′).
The first inequality follows from k ∈ B′′, and the second inequality holds since
goods in Cˆ have surplus zero and the flow into Cˆ comes from Bˆ. We now have
established p(B′) ≥ pk > 0. Thus, B′ is non-empty, and there is a j ∈ B′ with
pj ≥ p(B′)/n. We conclude pk ≤ npj.
We immediately obtain a bound on the number of xmax-iterations.
Lemma 8. The number of xmax-iterations is O(n
5 log(nU)).
Proof. By Lemma 7, prices are bounded by (nU)n and hence every price can
be multiplied by xmax at most O(logxmax(nU)
n) = O(n4 log(nU)) times. We
conclude that the number of xmax-iterations is O(n
5 log(nU)).
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In order to bound the number of balancing iterations, we study the evolution
of the norm of the surplus vector.
Lemma 9. Let f be a balanced flow in Np at the beginning of an iteration, let
f ′ be the flow in Np′ constructed in the iteration, and let r
′(B) be the surplus
vector with respect to f ′. Then
– ‖r′(B)‖ ≤ (1 +O(1/n3)) · ‖r(B)‖ in an xmax-iteration (x = xmax), and
– ‖r′(B)‖ ≤ ‖r(B)‖/(1 + Ω(1/n3)) in a balancing iteration (x < xmax).
Proof. We postpone the proof to the end of this section.
We can now prove a bound on the number of balancing iterations.
Lemma 10. The number of balancing iterations is O(n5 log(nU)).
Proof. For the initial flow and all prices equal to one, we have ‖r(B)‖ ≤ √n.
In the xmax-iterations, the norm of the surplus vector is multiplied by a factor
of at most (1 + O(1/n3))O(n
5 log(nU)). When the loop terminates, ‖r(B)‖ < ǫ.
Thus the number of balancing iterations is bounded by
log1+Ω(1/n3)(
1
ǫ
√
n(1 +O(1/n3))O(n
5 log(nU))) = O(n5 log(nU)).
Theorem 2. The algorithm in Figure 2 computes an equilibrium price vector
with O(n9 log(nU)) arithmetic operations. The number of multiplications and
divisions is only O(n8 log(nU)).
Proof. The number of iterations is O(n5 log(nU)). In each iteration, we need to
compute the quantities xeq(S), x23, and x24(S). This requires O(n
2) arithmetic
operations. The flow update requires the same number of arithmetic operations.
The computation of the new balanced flow requires n max flow computations.
Each max flow computation requires O(n3) arithmetic operations (only addi-
tions and abstractions).
The extraction of the equilibrium prices after termination of the loop requires
O(n4 log(nU)) arithmetic operations (Theorem 3).
Before we prove Lemma 9, we give the details of how to adjust the flow
when a new equality edge comes into existence, see Figure 3. Let (bi, cj) be the
new equality edge. We first use the surplus of bi to decrease the surplus of cj .
Remaining surplus is then used to increase the surplus of other neighbors of cj ;
this will further reduce the surplus of bi. We stop as soon as the surplus of bi
becomes equal to the surplus of a buyer in B \B(S) or, if B(S) = B, becomes
zero.
Lemma 11. If there is a new equality edge (bi, cj) with bi ∈ B(S), cj /∈ Γ(B(S)),
the program in Figure 3 constructs f ′′ from f ′ in which either r′′(bi) = r
′(bi)−pj,
or there is a bk /∈ B(S) with r′′(bi) = r′′(bk), or B(S) = B and r′′(bi) = 0.
Moreover, the surplus of no good is increased.
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Denote the new equality edge by (bi, cj) (bi ∈ B(S), cj /∈ Γ(B(S))).
Let w be the largest surplus of a buyer in B \B(S). Let w = 0 if B(S) = B.
(f ′′ is the current flow during augmentation, and r′′ is the surplus vector of f ′′.)
Augment along (bi, cj) gradually until:
r′′(bi) = w or r
′′(cj) = 0;
If r′′(bi) = w then Exit;
For all buyers bk with flows to cj in f
′ in any order
Augment along (bi, cj , bk) gradually until:
r′′(bi) = max(r
′′(bk), w) or f
′′(bk, cj) = 0;
Set w = max(r′′(bk), w);
If r′′(bi) = w then Exit.
f ′ = f ′′
Figure 3: Augmentation in case of a new equality edge
Proof. During the procedure, the surplus of bi decreases and the surpluses of
the buyers in B \ B(S) may increase. However, we make sure that the surplus
of bi does not become less than the surplus of a buyer in B \B(S). In the end, if
r′′(bi) = w, then there is a bk ∈ B \B(S) such that r′′(bi) = r′′(bk) or B(S) = B
and r′′(bi) = 0; otherwise, cj has no surplus at the end, the entire flow to it
comes from bi, and there was no flow from bi to cj before the change of flow.
Thus r′′(bi) = r
′(bi)− pj .
We come to the proof of Lemma 9. Let us summarize the effect of an
iteration.
Property (1): x ≤ xmax.
Property (2): : In f ′, r′(b) ≥ r′(b′) for all b ∈ B(S), b′ /∈ B(S). Here, r′(b) is
the surplus of b w.r.t. f ′, the flow corresponding to x by Theorem 1.
Property (3): If x < xmax, the following possibilities arise:
(a) If x = xeq(S), there is a new equality edge (bi, cj) with bi ∈ B(S), cj /∈
Γ(B(S)). The procedure in Figure 3 yields a flow f ′′ in which either
r′′(bi) = r
′(bi) − pj , or B(S) = B and r′′(bi) = 0, or there is a
bk /∈ B(S) with r′′(bi) = r′′(bk) (same as (b)).
(b) If x = x23(S) or x = x24(S), there exist b ∈ B(S) and b′ /∈ B(S) such
that r′(b) = r′(b′).
From Theorem 1, the surpluses in f ′ will increase for type 1 and 3 buyers,
will decrease for type 2 buyers, and will stay unchanged for type 4 buyers. The
set B(S) consists of the type 1 and type 2 buyers and hence before the change of
flow, the surplus of any type 1 or type 2 buyer is larger than the surplus of any
type 3 or type 4 buyer. The algorithm guarantees that the surplus of a type 1 or
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2 buyer cannot become smaller than the surplus of any type 3 or 4 buyer. From
Theorem 1 and Lemma 11, we infer that the surplus of no good increases and
hence the total surplus does not increase, that the surpluses of type 2 and type
3 and 4 buyers move towards each other, and that r′(b) = x · r(b) for any buyer
b. Thus ‖r′(B)‖ ≤ x‖r(B)‖ = (1 + O(1/n3))‖r(B)‖ and we have established
the first claim of Lemma 9.
We next show that the second claim holds in cases (3a) and (3b). In (3a),
there is a new equality edge (bi, cj). Assume first that r
′′(bi) = r
′(bi) − pj
(pj ≥ 1). For all bk /∈ B(S), r′′(bi) ≥ r′′(bk), and r′′(bk) = r′(bk) + δk, where
δk ≥ 0 and
∑
bk /∈B(S)
δk ≤ pj . Because |r(B)| ≤ n, ‖r(B)‖2 ≤ n2. By Lemma 1,
‖r′′(B)‖2 ≤ ‖r′(B)‖2 − p2j
≤ x2‖r(B)‖2 − 1
≤ x2‖r(B)‖2 − 1
n2
‖r(B)‖2
= (1−Θ(1/n2))‖r(B)‖2.
So, we have ‖r′′(B)‖ = (1 − Ω(1/n2))‖r(B)‖.
If B(S) = B and after the procedure in Figure 3 we have r′′(bi) = 0, then
|r(B)| ≥ 1 since there are goods that have no buyers, and r(bi) ≥ |r(B)|/(e ·n).
When bi is a type 1 buyer, r
′(bi) > r(bi). When bi is a type 2 buyer, pi = 1,
and r′(bi) = (1 − x)pi + x · r(bi) by Theorem 1. Thus, r′(bi) ≥ r(bi) − 1Rn3 ≥
|r(B)|
e·n − 1Rn3 . Also |r(B)|2 ≥ ‖r(B)‖2. Therefore,
‖r′′(B)‖2 ≤ ‖r′(B)‖2 − r′(bi)2
≤ x2max‖r(B)‖2 −
( |r(B)|
e · n −
1
Rn3
)2
≤ x2max‖r(B)‖2 −
( |r(B)|
e · n −
|r(B)|
Rn3
)2
≤ ‖r(B)‖2
((
1 +
1
Rn3
)2
−
(
1
e · n −
1
Rn3
)2)
= (1 −Θ(1/n2))‖r(B)‖2,
and hence ‖r′′(B)‖ = (1 − Ω(1/n2))‖r(B)‖.
If after the procedure described in Figure 3, there is bk /∈ B(S) such that
r′′(bi) = r
′′(bk), then we are in a similar situation as in (3b), possibly with an
even smaller total surplus. So, we can prove this case by the proof of (3b).
We turn to (3b). Let u1, u2, ..., uk and v1, v2, ..., vk′ be the list of original
surpluses of type 2 and 3 buyers, respectively. Define u = minui, v = max vj , so
ui ≥ u for all i, and vj ≤ v for all j, and u > (1+1/n)v. After the price and flow
adjustments in Theorem 1, the list of surpluses will be u1−δ1, u2−δ2, ..., uk−δk
and v1+ δ
′
1, v2+ δ
′
2, ..., vk+ δ
′
k′ (here δi, δ
′
j ≥ 0 for all i, j). Moreover, there exist
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I and J such that uI − δI = vJ + δ′J , where uI − δI is the smallest among
ui− δi, and vJ + δ′J is the largest among vj + δ′j by property (2). Since the total
surplus is non-increasing, and the surpluses of type 1 buyers (if any) increase,
the total surplus of type 2 and type 3 buyers will be non-increasing. Thus,
−∑i δi + ∑j δ′j ≤ 0, and hence ∑i δi ≥ ∑j δ′j . Clearly, δI ≤ ∑i δi, and
δ′J ≤
∑
j δ
′
j . Therefore,
∑
i
(ui − δi)2+
∑
j
(vj + δ
′
j)
2 − (
∑
i
u2i +
∑
j
v2j )
= −2
∑
i
uiδi + 2
∑
j
vjδ
′
j +
∑
i
δ2i +
∑
j
δ′
2
j
≤ −u
∑
i
δi + v
∑
j
δ′j −
∑
i
δi(ui − δi) +
∑
j
δ′j(vj + δ
′
j)
≤ −(u− v)
∑
i
δi − (uI − δI)
∑
i
δi + (vJ + δ
′
J )
∑
j
δ′j
≤ −(u− v)
∑
i
δi
≤ −(u− v)max(δI , δ′J)
≤ −1
2
(u− v)2
< − 1
2(n+ 1)2
u2
≤ − 4
Rn2
e2u2,
where the last inequality uses R = 256 ≥ 32e2 and n+ 1 ≤ 2n.
Let w1, w2, ...wk′′ be the list of surpluses of type 1 buyers; all of them are
at most e · u (Lemma 5) After price adjustment, the surpluses will be x ·w1, x ·
w2, ...x · wk′′ from Theorem 1. Therefore,
∑
i
(xwi)
2 ≤ (1 + 1
Rn3
)2
∑
i
w2i
≤
∑
i
w2i + (
2
Rn3
+
1
R2n6
) · ne2u2
=
∑
i
w2i + (
2
Rn2
+
1
R2n5
)e2u2.
Combining both bounds and using ‖r(B)‖2 ≤ ne2u2 since r(b) ≤ eu (Lemma 5)
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for every buyer b, we obtain
‖r′(B)‖2 < ‖r(B)‖2 + (− 4
Rn2
+
2
Rn2
+
1
R2n5
)e2u2
= ‖r(B)‖2 + (− 2
Rn2
+
1
R2n5
)e2u2
≤ ‖r(B)‖2 + (− 2
Rn2
+
1
R2n5
)
1
n
‖r(B)‖2
= ‖r(B)‖2 − 2
Rn3
‖r(B)‖2 + 1
R2n6
‖r(B)‖2
= ‖r(B)‖2(1− 1
Rn3
)2.
This completes the proof of Lemma 9.
2.4 Extraction of the Equilibrium Prices
We show how to extract equilibrium prices from a price vector p with total sur-
plus less than ǫ. The extraction process requires arithmetic on rational numbers
on polynomial bitlength.
We need the concept of the undirected equality graph Fp with respect to a
price vector p. It has vertex set B ∪ C. A buyer b and a good c are connected
by an undirected edge if and only if (b, c) ∈ Ep.
Theorem 3. Let p be a price vector with total surplus at most ǫ. The procedure
in Figure 4 converts p into a vector of equilibrium prices. It runs in time
O˜(n4 logU).
Proof. In the procedure, we first add the edge (bi, ci) for each agent i to the
undirected equality graph Fp to obtain F
′
p and then modify the prices such
that each connected component of F ′p contains a good with surplus. For a
connected component of F ′p, the sum of the prices on both sides are the same.
For all components Φ of F ′p with no surplus node, increase prices and flows by a
common factor until a new equality edge emerges; this will unite a component
with no surplus with a component with surplus and thus reduce the number of
components with no surplus by one. A new equality edge must emerge because
the buyers in a component own exactly the goods in the component and by
property (6) they must also receive utility from some good that they do not
own. Repeat this process until all components in F ′p have a surplus node. The
total surplus is still less than ǫ.
We may assume w.l.o.g. that F ′p becomes connected by this process. Other-
wise, the following argument can be applied independently to each component
of F ′p.
We will next discuss the set-up of a linear system of equations. We show
that it has full rank and that the price vector p satisfies it. We then show that
the solution to the same system with slightly modified right-hand sides yields
equilibrium prices.
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If there is no surplus with respect to p, return p;
add the edge (bi, ci) for each i to the undirected equality graph Fp to obtain F
′
p;
Repeat
for some connected component of F ′p with no surplus node, in-
crease prices and flows by a common factor, until a new equality
edges arises and thus two components are joined;
Until every connected component of F ′p contains a surplus node and
hence a good with price one;
/* For simplicity of description, we assume that F ′p consists of a single
connected component.*/
Let Ψ1 to ΨL be the connected components of Fp
Set up the following system of linear equations:
The equation p′i = 1, where ci is a good with surplus.
For each Ψk
|Ψk| − 1 linearly independent equations of the form uij′p′j = uijp′j′ ,
where cj and cj′ are goods in Ψk;
For each Ψk, but one
The equation
∑
bi∈B∩Ψk
p′i −
∑
ci∈C∩Ψk
p′i = 0;
Let p′i = qi/D, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, be a solution to this system where D is the
determinant of the coefficient matrix and qi is integral;
/* p′i is the rational with denominator at most (nU)
n closest to pi. */
return q = (q1, . . . , qn);
Figure 4: Converting the final price vector p into a set of equilibrium prices.
Denote the set of connected components in the undirected equality graph
Fp (not F
′
p) by Λ = {Ψk}. Consider any component Ψk in Fp. For any buyer bi
in the component and any two equality edges (bi, cj) and (bi, cj′), we have the
equation
uij′pj = uijpj′ . (5)
A subset of |Ψk ∩ C| − 1 of these equations is linearly independent, since the
price vector restricted to a component is determined up to multiplication by
a common factor. The total number of linear independent equations for all
components in Fp is n− |Λ|.
Since there is no flow between components, for each component Ψk in Fp,
the money difference between buyers and goods in Ψk is equal to the surplus
difference. Thus, we have the equation∑
bi∈B∩Ψk
pi −
∑
ci∈C∩Ψk
pi = ǫk, (6)
where ǫk (positive or negative) comes from the surpluses of goods and buyers
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in the component. Hence,
∑ |ǫk| ≤ 2ǫ<4ǫ. We work with the bound of 4ǫ,
because there will be additional error when we redo the proof of the theorem in
Section 3. If bi and ci belong to distinct connected components Ψj and Ψk, the
coefficient of pi is +1 in the equation of Ψj , −1 in the equation for Ψk, and 0 in
all other equations. If bi and ci belong to the same connected component, the
coefficient of pi is zero in all equations. In other words, in the coefficient matrix
for the equations (6) we have one row for each component and one column for
each i; the column for i is all zero if bi and ci belong to the same component
and contains a +1 and a −1 otherwise. Assume now that there is a proper
subset Λ′ of the components such that the equations corresponding to them are
linearly dependent. Then, if bi or ci belongs to some component in the subset,
both of them do. Thus for each i, the union of the components in Λ′ contains
either bi and ci or contains neither bi nor ci. We conclude that the union of
the components is also a union of connected components of F ′p. However, F
′
p
consists of a single component, and hence no proper subset of the equations
is linearly dependent. Therefore, any |Λ| − 1 of these equations are linearly
independent. Let L = |Λ|.
For the sequel, it will be convenient to eliminate the equations of type (5).
In the equation (6) for component Ψk, there must be at least one i such that
ci ∈ C ∩ Ψk and bi 6∈ B ∩ Ψk and at least one i such that bi ∈ B ∩ Ψk and
ci 6∈ C∩Ψk. This holds since prices are at least one and |ǫk| ≤ 2ǫ. After suitable
renumbering of goods, we may assume that ck ∈ C ∩Ψk and bk 6∈ B ∩Ψk. We
refer to ck as the representative good for component Ψk. For every good cj in
component Ψk, the price of cj is linearly related to the price of ck, i.e.,
pj = tjpk, (7)
where tj is a fraction whose numerator and denominator is a product of at most
n utilities. Substituting equations (7) into the equations (6), we obtain the
following equation for component Ψk:
 ∑
cj∈C∩Ψk
tj

 pk − ∑
1≤i≤|Λ|,i6=k

 ∑
bj∈B∩Ψk,cj∈C∩Ψi
tj

 pi = −ǫk. (8)
Let M = (mki) be the coefficient matrix of this system of equations. Then
mkk =
∑
bj∈B∩Ψk,cj∈C∩Ψi
tj > 0, mki = −
∑
bj∈B∩Ψi
tj ≤ 0, and all column
sums of M are equal to zero.
There is a good ci with non-zero surplus. Its price pi is equal to one. We may
assume w.l.o.g. that ci belongs to ΨL. Then pi = 1 is equivalent to pL = 1/ti.
We will next argue that the equations (8) for components Ψ1 to ΨL−1 and
equation pL = 1/ti are linearly independent. Let M
′ be the coefficient matrix
for this system;M ′ can be obtained fromM by settingmLi to zero for 1 ≤ i < L.
Assume, for the sake of a contradiction, that the rank of M ′ is less than L.
Then there is a nonzero vector aT = (a1, . . . , aL) such that a
TM ′ = 0. Let ak0
be an entry of maximum absolute value among a1 to aL−1. We may assume
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ak0 > 0. Let Λ
′ = {k | k < L and ak = ak0}. We may assume Λ′ = {1, . . . , L′}.
Consider any k ≤ L′. Then
0 =
∑
1≤h<L
ahmhk + aL · 0
= ak0
∑
1≤h≤L
mhk − ak0mLk +
∑
L′<h<L
(ah − ak0)mhk
= −ak0mLk −
∑
L′<h<L
(ak0 − ah)mhk,
and hence mhk = 0 for L
′ < h ≤ L. We will next show that we also have
mkh = 0 for k ≤ L′ and h > L′. Intuitively, this holds since mhk = 0 for h > L′
and k ≤ L′ means that there are no goods in components Ψ1 to ΨL′ whose
owners are in components ΨL′+1 to ΨL and hence the buyers in components Ψ1
to ΨL′ cannot own goods in components in ΨL′+1 to ΨL, since the surplus of
each component is small and the price of each good is at least 1. The formal
argument follows. Summing the equations for 1 ≤ k ≤ L′, we obtain∑
k≤L′
mkkpk +
∑
k≤L′
∑
i; i6=k
mkipi =
∑
k≤L′
ǫk.
Rearranging the second sum yields∑
k≤L′
ǫk =
∑
k≤L′
mkkpk +
∑
i
∑
k≤L′; k 6=i
mkipi
=
∑
k≤L′
mkkpk +
∑
i≤L′
∑
k≤L′; k 6=i
mkipi +
∑
i>L′
∑
k≤L′; k 6=i
mkipi
=
∑
i≤L′
miipi +
∑
i≤L′
∑
k 6=i
mkipi +
∑
i>L′
∑
k≤L′
mkipi
=
∑
i≤L′
(∑
k
mki
)
pi +
∑
i>L′
∑
k≤L′
mkipi
=
∑
i>L′
∑
k≤L′
mkipi.
If some mki with k ≤ L′ and i > L′ is nonzero, the right-hand side is less than
or equal to −1/Un, a contradiction. We have now shown that mkh 6= 0 only if
either k and h are less than or equal to L′ or both are larger. This implies that
Ψ1 ∪ . . . ∪ΨL′ is a union of connected components of F ′p. However, F ′p consists
of a single component, and hence this is impossible. Thus M ′ has full rank.
Altogether we have established that the system consisting of the equations
(5), (6), and equation pi = 1 are linearly independent. In matrix form, we can
write this system as Ap = X . The matrix A is invertible and has integral entries
bounded by U .
Consider the system Ap′ = X ′ for a price vector p′, where X ′ is the unit
vector with a one in the row corresponding to the equation pi = 1. The solution
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will be a vector of rational numbers with a common denominator D ≤ (nU)n
by Cramer’s rule. Since ||X | − |X ′|| < 4ǫ, any difference |p′i − pi| is at most
4ǫ · (nU)n = 1/(2n3nU2n) by Cramer’s rule. The vector p′ can be computed
in time O˜(n4 logU) time by Theorem 5.12 in [20]; solution of an n × n linear
system with integral entries bounded by U .
All prices p′i are of the form qi/D, where qi, D are integers and D ≤ (nU)n.
So,
|pi − qi
D
| = |p′i − pi| ≤ 1/(2n3nU2n) = ǫ′/D,
where ǫ′ = D/(2n3nU2n) ≤ 1/(2n2nUn). Consider any bi ∈ B and cj , ck ∈ C
and assume uij/pj ≤ uik/pk. Then,
uijqk ≤ uij(pkD + ǫ′)
≤ uikpjD + uijǫ′
≤ uik(qj + ǫ′) + uijǫ′
≤ uikqj + (uik + uij)ǫ′
< uikqj + 1,
and hence, uijqk ≤ uikqj since uijqk and uikqj are integral. We conclude that
the equality edges with respect to p are also equality edges with respect to q
and hence the edges of Np are also present in Nq.
Let Z =
∑
i qi. Then Z is the capacity of the cuts (s,B ∪ C ∪ t) and
(s∪B ∪C, t) in Nq. We will show that both cuts are min-cuts in Nq and hence
the price vector q is a market equilibrium. The capacity of the cuts above in Np
is at least (Z−nǫ′)/D. If the cuts above are not min-cuts, there must be a cut of
capacity at most Z−1 in Nq as the capacities in Nq are integral. This cut is also
a cut in Np and has capacity at most (Z−1)/D+2nǫ′/D = Z/D−(1−2nǫ′)/D
in Np. Thus, any maximum flow in Np has surplus at least
∑
i
pi −
(
Z
D
− 1− 2nǫ
′
D
)
≥ −nǫ
′
D
+
1− 2nǫ′
D
=
1− 3nǫ′
D
> ǫ,
a contradiction.
We remark that each p′i is the rational with denominator at most (nU)
n
closest to pi. Observe first that the distance of two distinct rational numbers
of denominator at most (nU)n is a at least (nU)2n and hence is larger than
2|p′i − pi|. Since p′i is a rational number with denominator at most (nU)n, p′i is
the rational number with denominator at most (nU)n nearest to pi. One can
compute p′i from pi by continued fraction expansion. Continued fraction expan-
sion requires the floor-operation in addition to the basic arithmetic operations.
2.5 General Case
We now drop assumption (6) of Section 1.2, i.e., there may be a proper subset
P of agents such that uij = 0 for all i ∈ P and j 6∈ P . We follow [22, 10].
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Consider the liking graph of agents in which there is a directed edge from i to
j iff uij > 0. If the graph is strongly connected, assumption (7) is satisfied.
Otherwise, we determine a topological order of strongly connected components
P1, P2, ...Pk, in which there are only edges from a lower numbered to higher
numbered components. We need the assumption that if a strongly connected
component consists of a single agent i, then uii > 0, i.e., the agent likes its own
good. Assumptions 1 to 5 and this assumption are necessary and sufficient for
the existence of an equilibrium in the linear exchange model [16, 17].
We use the algorithm in Section 2 to compute the equilibrium for the agents
in every strongly connected component Pi (i = 1, 2, ..., k). Note that the ex-
istence of a self-loop for components of size one guarantees the existence of a
solution for such components. For i = 2, ..., k, multiplying the prices in Pi by
(U +1) ·max {pj | j ∈ Pi−1} ensures that there are no equality edges from Pi to
Pj for i < j. Since the agents in Pj do not like any goods in Pi for i < j, this
will not affect the equilibrium of any component, and hence we obtain a global
equilibrium.
2.6 A Remark on Arithmetic
Our algorithm uses only rational arithmetic. Utilities are assumed to be integral
and all prices are initially equal to one. In each iteration we multiply some of
the prices by a factor x; x is the minimum of xeq(S), x23(S), x24(S), and
xmax. Each of these quantities is rational. However, the bitlength of the prices
may potentially double in each iteration, since xeq(S), x23(S), and x24(S) are
quotients involving prices and surpluses.
3 Polynomial Time
In order to achieve polynomial time, we have to reduce the cost of arithmetic
without loosing the polynomial bound on the number of iterations. We use
the following approach. We restrict prices and the update factor x to powers
of (1 + 1/L), where L has polynomial bitlength. In the iterative part of the
algorithm, we also approximate utilities by powers of 1 + 1/L. We compute
surpluses only approximately. The key technical result is that the approximate
computation of surpluses and the factor x increases the norm of the surplus
vector by only a factor 1 + O(1/n4) in each iteration. This is an order of
magnitude less than the change stated in Lemma 9. We conclude that the
number of iterations is still O(n5 log(nU)). In the extraction of the equilibrium,
we have to cope with the additional error introduced by rounding the utilities
to powers of (1 + 1/L). This is no problem, since we left some leeway in the
proof of Theorem 3.
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3.1 Iterative Improvement, Revisited
We restrict prices to the form (1+1/L)k, 0 ≤ k ≤ K, where L = 16n5(nU)n/ǫ =
128n5n+5U4n and K is chosen such that (nU)n ≤ (1 + 1/L)K . This choice of
K guarantees that the full range [1..(nU)n] of potential prices is covered. Then
K = O(nL log(nU)). We represent a price pi = (1 + 1/K)
ei by its exponent
ei ∈ N. Here, N denotes the natural numbers including zero. The bitlength of
ei is logK = O(n log(nU)).
We approximate utilities by powers of (1 + 1/L). For a utility uij ∈ [1..U ],
let eij ∈ N be such that |eij − log1+1/L uij | < 1 and let u˜ij = (1+1/L)eij . Then
uij/(1+1/L) ≤ u˜ij ≤ uij(1+1/L). The exponent eij can be computed from uij
in time polynomial in logU and logL, see Section 3.3. It is tempting to define
eij as ⌈log1+1/L uij⌉, but for this definition, we do not know how to compute
eij in polynomial time.
We say that real number b is an additive 1/L-approximation of real number
a if |a − b| ≤ 1/L. It is a multiplicative (1 + 1/L)-approximation if a/b ∈
[1/(1 + 1/L), 1 + 1/L].
We compute the surplus vector with respect to p only approximately. To
this end, we replace each price pi by an approximation pˆi with denominator
L (note that the denominator of pi might be as large as L
K) and compute a
balanced flow in a modified equality network N(p, pˆ).
The approximation pˆi is a rational number with denominator L and an
additive 1/L- and a multiplicative (1 + 1/L)-approximation of pi, i.e.,
pˆi =
qi
L
, qi ∈ N, |pi − pˆi| ≤ 1
L
,
pˆi
pi
∈ [1/(1 + 1/L), (1 + 1/L)]. (9)
We will see in Section 3.3 that qi can be computed in time polynomial in logL.
Again, it is tempting to define qi as ⌈piL⌉, but for this definition, we do not
know how to compute qi in polynomial time.
For two price vectors p and pˆ, the equality network N(p, pˆ) has its edge set
determined by p and its edge capacities determined by pˆ, i.e., it has
– an edge (s, bi) with capacity pˆi for each bi ∈ B,
– an edge (ci, t) with capacity pˆi for each ci ∈ C, and
– an edge (bi, cj) with infinite capacity whenever u˜ij/pj = maxℓ u˜iℓ/pℓ. We
use Ep to denote this set of edges.
Let fˆ be a balanced flow in N(p, pˆ). For a buyer bi, let rˆ(bi) = pˆi− fˆsi be its
surplus, for a good ci, let rˆ(ci) = pˆi− fˆit be its surplus. As in Section 2, we order
the buyers by decreasing surplus and let ℓ be minimal such that rˆ(bℓ)/rˆ(bℓ+1) >
1+ 1/n. If there is no such ℓ, let ℓ = n. Let S = rˆ(bℓ) and B(S) = {b1, . . . , bℓ}.
Then rˆ(bℓ) ≥ rˆ(b1)/e ≥ rˆ(B)/(en) as in Section 2.
Since prices are now restricted to powers of 1 + 1/L, the update factor x
has to be a power of 1 + 1/L, and hence we need to modify its definition and
computation. We compute x in two steps. We first compute a factor xˆ from pˆ
as in Section 2 and then obtain x from xˆ by rounding to a near power of 1+1/L.
We use x to update the price vector p. The prices of all goods in Γ(B(S)) are
multiplied by x. The resulting algorithm is shown in Figure 5.
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Set R = 32e2, ǫ = 1/(4n4nU3n), ∆ = n5/ǫ, and xmax = 1 + 1/(Rn
3);
Set pˆi = pi = 1 for all i and let fˆ be a balanced flow in N(p, pˆ);
Repeat
Sort the buyers by their surpluses rˆ(b) in decreasing order: b1, b2, ..., bn;
Find the smallest ℓ for which rˆ(bℓ)/rˆ(bℓ+1) > 1 + 1/n, and
let ℓ = n when there is no such ℓ;
Let S = rˆ(bℓ) and B(S) = {b1, . . . , bℓ};
Compute xˆ = min(xeq(S), xˆ23(S), xˆ24(S), xmax);
Compute x as an 1 + 1/L approximation of xˆ;
Replace pi by xpi for ci ∈ Γ(B(S));
Let pˆ be computed from p according to (9);
Update fˆ to a balanced maximum flow in N(p, pˆ);
Exit from the loop if |rˆ(B)| < ǫ;
Round p to equilibrium prices by the procedure in Figure 4;
Figure 5: The polynomial time algorithm
We define xˆ as the minimum of xeq(S), xˆ23(S), xˆ24(S), and xmax. The
definition of xeq(S) is in terms of the rounded utilities:
xeq(S) = min
{
u˜ij
pj
· pk
u˜ik
| bi ∈ B(S), (bi, cj) ∈ Ep, ck /∈ Γ(B(S))
}
.
By definition, xeq(S) is a power of 1 + 1/L. We redefine xmax as a power of
(1 + 1/L) such that 1 + 1/(Rn3) ≥ xmax ≥ (1 + 1/R(n3))/(1 + 1/L)2. Such
an xmax can be computed in polynomial time, see Section 3.3. The quantities
xˆ23(S) and xˆ24(S) are defined in terms of the price vector pˆ and the surplus
vector rˆ.
xˆ23(S) = min
{
pˆi + pˆj − rˆ(bj)
pˆi + pˆj − rˆ(bi) | bi is type 2 and bj is type 3 buyer
}
xˆ24(S) = min
{
pˆi − rˆ(bj)
pˆi − rˆ(bi) | bi is type 2 and bj is type 4 buyer
}
We then define x23(S) and x24(S) as powers of 1 + 1/L such that
xˆ23(S)/x23(S), xˆ24(S)/x24(S) ∈ [1/(1 + 1/L), 1 + 1/L].
The quantities xeq(S), xˆ23(S), xˆ24(S), x23(S), and x24(S) can be computed in
polynomial time, see Section 3.3. Let xˆ = min(xeq(S), xˆ23(S), xˆ24(S), xmax) and
let x = min(xeq , x23(S), x24(S), xmax). Clearly, x is a multiplicative (1 + 1/L)-
approximation of xˆ.
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pp′
pˆ, flow fˆ in N(p, pˆ), compute xˆ and x
p¯, flow f¯ in N(p′, p¯) p˜, flow f˜ in N(p′, p˜)
update by x
round
round
(1− 1/L)3-approximation
update pˆ by xˆ to p˜
Figure 6: We maintain p, pˆ, p′ and p¯. We compute xˆ from pˆ and the balanced
flow fˆ in N(p, pˆ); x is obtained from xˆ by rounding to power for 1 + 1/L. We
update p by x to obtain p′ which we then round to p¯. The flow f¯ is a balanced
flow in N(p′, p¯). We obtain it from fˆ by first multiplying the flow on the edges
incident to goods in Γ(B(S)) by factors near x, then augmenting the flow as
in Figure 3 and finally balancing the flow. The price vector p˜ and the flow f˜
are used in the analysis; p˜ is obtained from pˆ by updating with xˆ and f˜ is then
obtained as in Section 2.
We use x to update the prices: p′i = xpi for each good ci ∈ Γ(B(S)) and
p′i = pi for any ci 6∈ Γ(B(S)). The new vector p¯ of rounded prices is defined by
(9) from p′. We also introduce an intermediate price vector p˜ which plays no role
in the algorithm, but is crucial for the analysis: p˜i = xˆpˆi for ci ∈ Γ(B(S)) and
p˜i = pˆi for ci 6∈ Γ(B(S)). Observe that p¯ is obtained from p by first updating
to p′ by x and then rounding according to (9) and that p˜ is obtained from p by
first rounding to pˆ and then updating by xˆ. Clearly, p¯i = p˜i for ci 6∈ Γ(B(S)).
For ci ∈ Γ(B(S)), p˜i is a multiplicative (1 + 1/∆)3 approximation of p¯i, since
p˜i
p¯i
∈ xˆpˆi
p′i · [1/(1 + 1/L), 1 + 1/L]
⊆ xpi · [1/(1 + 1/L)
2, (1 + 1/L)2]
xpi · [1/(1 + 1/L), (1 + 1/L)] ⊆ [1/(1 + 1/L)
3, (1 + 1/L)3].
Figure 6 illustrates the definitions.
Lemma 9 applies to the transition from a balanced flow fˆ in N(p, pˆ) to a
balanced flow f˜ in N(p′, p˜). In particular,
– ‖r˜(B)‖ ≤ (1 +O(1/n3)) · ‖rˆ(B)‖ in an xmax-iteration (x = xmax), and
– ‖r˜(B)‖ ≤ ‖rˆ(B)‖/(1 + Ω(1/n3)) in a balancing iteration (x < xmax).
Here rˆ(B) and r˜(B) are the surplus vectors with respect to flow fˆ in N(p, pˆ)
and flow f˜ in N(p′, p˜).
Let f¯ be a balanced maximum flow in N(p′, p¯) with the property that goods
with surplus zero with respect to fˆ also have surplus zero with respect to f¯ .7
7One may compute f¯ as follows. First, determine for each good ci the factor xi = p¯i/pˆi.
Then multiply the flows on all edges incident to ci ∈ Γ(B(S)) by xi. Adjust the flow on the
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Let f∗ = f˜ /(1 + 1/L)3 be the flow f˜ scaled by a factor 1/(1 + 1/L)3. Since
p¯i ≥ p˜i/(1 + 1/L)3, f∗ is a feasible flow in N(p′, p¯). Thus
‖r¯(B)‖ ≤ ‖r∗(B)‖,
where r∗(B) is the surplus vector with respect to f∗ and r¯(B) is the surplus
vector with respect to f¯ . The inequality holds since f¯ is a balanced maximum
flow in N(p′, p¯) and f∗ is a feasible flow in the same network. We finish the
analysis of the update step by showing that ‖r∗(B)‖ is bounded by (1+O(1/n4))·
‖r˜(B)‖.
Lemma 12. For any buyer bi: |r∗(bi)− r˜(bi)| ≤ 8(nU)n/L.
Proof. By the definition of surpluses,
|r∗(bi)− r˜(bi)| = |p¯i − f∗si − (p˜i − f˜si)| ≤ |p¯i − p˜i|+ |f∗si − f˜si|.
In both terms on the right hand side, the quantities involved are bounded by the
maximum price and are multiplicative (1+1/L)3-approximations of each other.
Thus the difference is bounded by 2(nU)n ·4/L, since (1+1/L)3− 1 ≤ 4/L.
Lemma 13. ‖r∗(B)‖ = (1 +O(1/n4)) · ‖r˜(B)‖ if |r˜(B)| ≥ ǫ/2 and |r∗(B)| ≤ ǫ
if |r˜(B)| ≤ ǫ/2.
Proof. Assume first, that |r˜(B)| ≥ ǫ/2. Then (using ‖r˜(B)‖2 ≥ |r˜(B)|2/n)
‖r∗(B)‖ ≤
∑
b∈B
(r˜(b) + 8(nU)n/L)2
= ‖r˜(B)‖2 + 2 · 8(nU)n|r˜(B)|/L + 64n(nU)2n/L2
≤ ‖r˜(B)‖2(1 + 1
n4
)2.
The inequality holds since
8(nU)n|r˜(B)|/L ≤ |r˜(B)|2/n5 ≤ ‖r˜(B)‖2/n4
and
8n1/2(nU)n/L ≤ |r˜(B)|/n9/2 ≤ ‖r˜(B)‖/n4.
Assume next that |r˜(B)| ≤ ǫ/2. Then
|r∗(B)| ≤ |r˜(B)| + 8n(nU)n/L ≤ ǫ.
We can now reprove Lemma 9 and the polynomial bound on the number of
iterations.
edges (s, bi) such that flow conservation holds. If x = xeq(S), run the procedure of Figure 3.
Next, augment the flow along augmenting paths from s to t until the flow is maximum. Finally,
balance the flow.
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Lemma 14. Let fˆ be a balanced maximum flow in N(p, pˆ) and let f¯ be a
balanced maximum flow in N(p′, p¯). Then either |r¯(B)| ≤ ǫ or
– ‖r¯(B)‖ = (1 +O(1/n3))‖rˆ(B)‖ in an xmax-iteration, and
– ‖r¯(B)‖ = ‖rˆ(B)‖/(1 + Ω(1/n3)) in a balancing iteration.
Proof. Assume |r¯(B)| > ǫ. Then |r∗(B)| > ǫ since f¯ is a maximum flow and f∗
is a feasible flow. Thus r˜(B) > ǫ/2 and ‖r∗(B)‖ = (1 + O(1/n4)) · ‖r˜(B)‖ by
Lemma 13. The claim follows.
Theorem 4. The number of iterations is O(n5 log(nU).
Proof. This is proved as in Section 2.
3.2 Extracting the Market Equilibrium, Revisited
We proceed essentially as in Section 2.4. We go through the proof of Theorem 3
and indicate the required changes.
We first make sure that every component of F ′p contains a good with surplus
and hence price one. This is as in the proof of Theorem 3. We work with the
rounded utilities u˜ and prices that are powers of 1 + 1/L.
We next discuss the set-up of the linear system. Consider any component
Ψk of the undirected equality graph (with respect to utilities u˜ and price vector
p). As in Section 2.4, select any |Ψk ∩ C| − 1 independent equations. For each
equation u˜ij′pj = u˜ijpj′ in this set add the equation
uij′pj − uijpj′ = (uij′ − u˜ij′ )pj + (u˜ij − uij)pj′
to the system. Note that the absolute value of the right hand side is bounded
by 2(nU)nU/L ≤ ǫ/n.
Since there is no flow between components, for each component Ψk in Fp,
the money difference between buyers and goods in Ψk is equal to the surplus
difference. Thus, we have the equation∑
bi∈B∩Ψk
pˆi −
∑
ci∈C∩Ψk
pˆi = ǫk
where ǫk (positive or negative) comes from the surpluses of goods and buyers
in the component. Hence,
∑ |ǫk| ≤ 2ǫ. We replace pˆ by p and add the equation∑
bi∈B∩Ψk
pi −
∑
ci∈C∩Ψk
pi = ǫk + δk
to the system. Here |δk| ≤ n(nU)n/L ≤ ǫ/n.
The last equation is pi = 1, where ci is a good that had price one at termi-
nation of the loop.
The linear system Ap = X has full rank. As above, let X ′ be the unit
vector with a zero in the row corresponding to the equation pi = 1, and let p
′
be a solution to the system Ap′ = X ′. As before, p′ is a vector of rationals
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with common denominator detA. Let p′i = qi/D with qi ∈ N. Observe that
||X | − |X ′|| < 4ǫ. In the proof of Theorem 3 we used the same inequality.
We next show that equality edges with respect to utilities u˜ and price vector
p are equality edges with respect to the true utilities u and price vector q.
Observe
|pi − qi
D
| = |p′i − pi| ≤ 1/(2n3nU2n) = ǫ′/D,
where ǫ′ = D/(2n3nU2n) ≤ 1/(2n2nUn). Consider any bi ∈ B and cj , ck ∈ C
and assume u˜ij/pj ≤ u˜ik/pk. Then,
uijqk ≤ u˜ij(1 + 1/L)(pkD + ǫ′)
≤ u˜ijpkD + u˜ij((pkD + ǫ′)/L+ ǫ′)
≤ u˜ikpjD + u˜ij((pkD + ǫ′)/L+ ǫ′)
≤ uik(1 + 1/L)(qj + ǫ′) + u˜ij((pkD + ǫ′)/L+ ǫ′)
≤ uikqj + uik((qj + ǫ′)/L+ ǫ′) + u˜ij((pkD + ǫ′)/L+ ǫ′)
< uikqj + 3U(nU)
2n/L
≤ uikqj + 1,
and hence, uijqk ≤ uikqj since uijqk and uikqj are integral. Thus every equality
edge with respect to utilities u˜ and price vector p is also an equality edge with
respect to the true utilities u and price vector q. Let Nq be the flow network
with respect to price vector q. The proof is now completed as in Section 2.4.
Theorem 5. Assume rˆ(B) ≤ ǫ. Then a vector of equilibrium prices can be
extracted from the equality graph Ep with respect to the rounded utilities u˜ in
time O˜(n4 log(nU)).
3.3 Details of Arithmetic
We show that arithmetic in rational numbers of bitlength O(n log(nU)) suffices.
Lemma 15. Let a ≥ 1 be a real number and let b be a rational with |b − a| ≤
1/(4L). Let L ≥ 3 and let q be the integer closest to bL. Then
|a− q
L
| ≤ 3
4L
<
1
L
and
a
q/L
∈ [ 1
1 + 1/L
, 1 + 1/L].
Proof. Clearly |q− bL| ≤ 1/2 and hence |q/L−a| ≤ |q/L− b|+ |b−a| ≤ 3/(4L).
This proves the first claim. For the second claim, we divide by a and obtain
|(q/L)/a− 1| ≤ 3/(4aL) ≤ 3/(4L). For L ≥ 3, 1/(1 + 1/L) ≥ 1 − 3/(4L) and
1 + 3/(4L) ≤ 1 + 1/L.
Lemma 16. Let k ∈ N be such that (1 + 1/L)k ≤ (nU)n. Then log k =
O(nL log(nU)). A rational number b with |b − (1 + 1/L)k)| ≤ 1/(4L) can
be computed with O(n log(nU)) arithmetic operations (additions, subtractions,
multiplications) on rational numbers of bitlength O(n log(nU)).
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Proof. We compute (1+1/L)k by repeated squaring using fixed point arithmetic
with Z bits after the binary point. Then the rounding error in any arithmetic
operation is at most 2−Z . Any rounding error is blown up by a factor at most
(nU)n by subsequent operations, since all intermediate values are bounded by
(nU)n. Repeated squaring requires log k operations. Thus the total error is
O(nL log(nU)) · (nU)n · 2−Z . This is less than 1/(4L) for Z = Ω(n log(nU) +
logL).
The mapping from p to pˆ and from p′ to p¯ is covered by the preceding
Lemma. It requires n2 log(nU) arithmetic operations on numbers of bitlength
O(n log(nU)).
The computation of xeq requires O(n
2) additions and subtractions of num-
bers of bitlength O(n log(nU)).
The components fˆij of the balanced flow fˆ are rational numbers bounded
by (nU)n with denominator Ln!. Thus, xˆ23 and xˆ24 n2 can be computed with
n2 arithmetic operations on numbers of bitlength O(n log(nU)).
Lemma 17. Let xˆ be a rational number. Then a k ∈ N such that x = (1+1/L)k
is a multiplicative (1 + 1/L)-approximation of xˆ can be computed with O(logL)
arithmetic operations (additions, subtractions, multiplications) on numbers of
bitlength O(n log(nU))
Proof. We can find k by binary search. In each step of the binary search, we
need to compare xˆ with (1+1/L)ℓ for some ℓ. Assume that b is a multiplicative
(1 + 1/L)-approximation of (1 + 1/L)ℓ and let k′ = log1+1/L xˆ. We compare xˆ
with b(1 + 1/L) and b/(1 + 1/L). If xˆ > b(1 + 1/L), k′ > ℓ. If xˆ < b/(1 + 1/L),
k′ < ℓ. If b/(1 + 1/L) ≤ xˆ ≤ b(1 + 1/L), we may return ℓ. Also, once we
have found ℓ such that (1 + 1/L)ℓ ≤ k′ ≤ (1 + 1/L)ℓ+1, we may return ℓ. The
strategy essentially requires to compute the powers (1+1/L)ℓ for ℓ’s that lie on
one path of the binary search. All such powers can be computed with O(logL)
arithmetic operations.
The computation of x from xˆ thus requires O(n log(nU)) arithmetic opera-
tions on number of bitlength O(n log(nU) + logL).
The computation of the balanced flow f¯ consists of two steps. First mul-
tiplying the flows on edges incident to good ci ∈ Γ(B(S)) by xi = p¯i/pi and
then recomputing the flow on the edges (s, bi). Then augmenting the flow as in
Figure 3. Finally, augmentation to a maximum flow and balancing.
The computation of the balanced flow is most costly. It requires n max-flow
computation. Each max-flow computation needs O(n3) arithmetic operations
(only additions and subtractions) on numbers of bitlength O(n log(nU)).
Theorem 6. An iteration takes time O(n5 log(nU)) (even with the use of
quadratic algorithms for multiplication and division).
3.4 Putting Everything Together
We can now put everything together.
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Theorem 7. Assume that utilities are integers bounded by U . An equilibrium
price vector can be computed in time O(n10 log2(nU)).
4 Conclusion
We believe that the running time analysis of our algorithm can be improved.
We have shown that the number of iterations is O(n5 log(nU)) and that each
iteration can be implemented to run in O(n5 log(nU)). Both bounds are proba-
bly overly pessimistic. We see two possible directions for improving the bound
on the cost of an iteration: Show that a balanced flow can be computed faster
than with Θ(n) maxflow computations, or show that in our algorithm not every
iteration requires n maxflow computations.
The development of a strongly polynomial algorithm for the linear Arrow-
Debreu market is a major open problem. A strongly polynomial algorithms for
the linear Fisher market was given by Orlin [25].
The generalization of our algorithm to more general utility functions is also
interesting. For Fisher’s market Vazirani [26] extended the algorithm by Deva-
nur et al [11] to spending constraint utilities.
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